Abstract. A biased coin game between two players is analyzed using minimax and maximin optimization problems. A Nash-equilibrium is established. The problem is completely solved and the Nash-equilibrium is shown to be unique for the case of one or two tosses. A conjecture is stated for the general case.
Introduction
The following problem is well-known in the area of probability. A biased coin is given, but the probability of heads is unknown. We flip it n times and get k heads. Estimate the probability of heads. This is called parameter estimation, because the probability of heads is a parameter of the coin. The most typical approach to solve this problem is the Maximal Likelihood method [7] . Let p = P (heads). Then P (k heads out of n tosses) = n k p k (1 − p) n−k .
Since we have absolutely no information about p, we choose p ∈ [0, 1] for which this expression is maximal. This approach has several shortcomings. 1.) For small n we get unrealistic estimations. For example, if n = 1 and we get a head, the method gives the estimation p = 1, and if we get a tail, the method gives p = 0. 2.) The method grabs the highest p, but does not take into account the error in the estimation. This can be seen in the following example. Suppose we are choosing a probability of the form p ∈ {0.2 + k/1000, k = 1, ..., 100} ∪ {0.8} and event E k (k = 1, 2, ..., 101) occurs. Then, when p = 0.2 + k/1000, we have P (E k ) = 0.2, and when p = 0.8 we have P (E 101 ) = 0.21. If we estimate the value of p using the Maximum Likelihood method, we obtain p = 0.8 because 0.21 is the highest probability. However, this is just slightly larger than 0.2 and for 100 choices of p we have P (E k ) = 0.2. So we are better off choosing p = 0.3, for example, in order to avoid making a large error.
Another approach to estimating p for a biased coin comes from decision theory ( [3] ), and requires the use of a loss or utility function. Our method also requires a loss function, but ours is different than the ones found in the literature. We solve the problem using game theory. There are two players: Player I and Player II. Player I selects a probability p, and Player II makes a guess a i for the value of p, knowing i, the number of heads out of n tosses. They agree that Player II must pay |p − a i | dollars as a penalty to Player I. More generally, we will assume that p can be a Borel probability measure on [0, 1], not just a fixed number, and so can the choices of a i . The goal of Player I is to choose p to maximize the penalty, while the goal of Player II is to minimize the penalty. The choices of these Borel measures are secretly made, however, we shall see that a Nash-equilibrium (see [5] , [6] ) of the best strategies exists, and because of this, they can be made public.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains a description of the problem, Section 3 contains our main result concerning the case of two tosses, and Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the proofs of our main result.
Description of the game
This is a two-player game. Player I selects a probability p ∈ [0, 1] and creates a coin such that P (heads) = p. He tosses the coin n times. Let i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} be the number of heads observed. Player I provides the value of i to Player II. Then, based on this value, Player II makes a guess a i ∈ [0, 1] for the value of p. Based on this guess, he will pay a |p − a i | penalty to Player I. Obviously, the goal of Player I is to maximize this penalty, while Player II wants to minimize it.
More generally, let Ω denote the set of all probability distributions on the interval [0, 1]. Suppose that when making their decisions, Player I is allowed to choose µ ∈ Ω and he picks p to follow the distribution dµ, and Player II picks x i to follow his choice of dσ i distributions, where
Therefore, the expected penalty of Player II is
is the expected penalty function given that P (heads) = p. In these terms, the goal of Player I will be to find Now, the following theorem establishes the Nash-equilibrium.
Theorem 2.1.
Proof. The theorem is a consequence of Glicksberg's theorem [3] . For completeness we include a constructive illustration. Without loss of generality we can restrict to the case n = 1, the case n > 1 being easily generalized. First, we prove the theorem under the assumption that σ 0 , σ 1 and µ are supported on the discrete set I := I N = {0, 
Thus, the game played on I × I × I can be considered as a game played on a matrix sized (N + 1) 2 × (N + 1), and, for such games, the Nash-equilibrium exists. Therefore, the theorem is true on I × I × I.
Letting N → ∞, we get finer and finer approximations of the function D on the discrete grid I × I × I. Since D is continuous, a standard argument utilizing weak * convergence completes the proof.
For our analysis it is important to make use of the following discretization of the probability distribution setting above. D(a 0 , ..., a n ; p)
.., a n ; µ) .
Observe that, by the continuity of D(a 0 , . . . , a n ; p), we get max µ∈Ω E(a 0 , ..., a n ; µ) = D(a 0 , ..., a n ; ·) ∞ .
Hence, min
D(a 0 , ..., a n ; p)
On the other hand, if for fixed points a 0 , . . . , a n ∈ [0, 1], we take σ i = δ a i , it is clear that E(σ 0 , ..., σ n ; µ) = E(a 0 , ..., a n ; µ) and, thus
max µ∈Ω E(a 0 , ..., a n ; µ) ,
D(a 0 , ..., a n ; p) = D(a 0 , ..., a n ; ·) ∞ , and this settles the proof of (2.6).
. . , a n ; p) be an optimal penalty function in the sense of Theorem 2.2. Then, the following result will be useful.
Proof. The proof of part (i) easily follows from the fact that, from (2.2), the derivative f ′ (p) has a positive jump as p passes through a i and, thus, f (p) cannot be increasing/decreasing as we pass through a i .
To prove (iii) we will first show that a 0 ≤ 1/2 ≤ a n . Indeed, it is easily seen that
Similarly, 1 − a n = f (1) ≤ 1/2, and thus a 0 ≤ 1/2 ≤ a n .
Suppose now that M (f ) ∩ [a 0 , a n ] = ∅. Because a 0 , a n ∈ M (f ), there is δ > 0, such that [a 0 − δ, a n + δ] ∩ M (f ) = ∅. Using a similar argument as in the proof of (ii), we have that for ǫ > 0 small enough and 0 ≤ p ≤ a 0 − δ < 1/2, D(a 0 − ǫ, a 1 , . . . , a n−1 , a n + ǫ; p) = D(a 0 , . . . , a n ; p)
. . , a n ; p)
We can also prove the same inequality for a n + δ < p ≤ 1 from which we conclude that
. . , a n−1 , a n + ǫ; p) ∞ < D(a 0 , . . . , a n ; p) ∞ = f ∞ , which is a contradiction with the optimality of f .
Next, the considerations above will be illustrated for the simplest case of n = 1 tosses. Example: The Case of n = 1 Tosses. Because of the simplicity and the symmetry of the problem, the method to find the strategies satisfying the Nash-equilibrium (2.5) can be carried out easily in this simple case. Therefore, we skip the details.
The optimal µ discrete strategy of Player I is the following: choose the atomic measure µ = Figure 1 . Since for all p ∈ [0, 1] we have f (p) ≤ 0.25, we gain that for any µ ∈ Ω we have E(σ 0 , σ 1 ; µ) ≤ 0.25. So the Nashequilibrium is established, and if both players follow the outlined strategies, then Player II pays E(a 0 , a 1 ; µ) = 0.25 dollars to Player I.
The case of n = 2 tosses
The following is our main result about the existence and uniqueness of strategies for Players I and II in order to reach the Nash-equilibrium in the case of two tosses. 
is the unique real root of the polynomial x 3 − x 2 + 3x − 1, and
The weights m i are given by:
Player II: Choose the following values a i The graph of the optimal penalty function given in Theorem 3.1, f (p) = D(a 0 , a 1 , a 2 ; p), is shown in Figure 2 . Observe that the following interlacing property p 0 < a 0 < p 1 < a 1 < p 2 < a 2 < p 3 holds. Now we are ready to state the following conjecture about the case of n tosses, and formulate an open problem for future investigation.
Conjecture. For the case of n tosses, there exists a "unique" Nash-equilibrium (in the sense of E(σ i ) = a i ), namely, there exist {a 0 , ..., a n }, {p 0 , ..., p n+1 }, and weights {m 0 , ..., m n+1 } in [0, 1], that determine an optimal strategy. Moreover, the optimal penalty function has an equimax property, namely f (p i ) = f ∞ , for i = 0, 1, . . . , n + 1.
If the above conjecture proves to be true, an interesting question would be to determine the limit distributions of the optimal discrete measures ν n = n i=0 δ a i,n , and µ n = n+1 i=0 m i,n δ p i,n when n approaches infinity.
We also remark, that the equimax property conjectured above and evidenced in Figure 1 and Figure 2 , has a striking resemblance to equimax property of the optimal Lebesgue function as stated in the well-known Bernstein-Erdős conjecture proved by Kilgore [4] and deBoor-Pinkus [2] .
The following two sections are devoted to the proofs of our main result, Theorem 3.1. Section 4 is concerned with the proof of the existence of the Nash-equilibrium, while Section 5 deals with the uniqueness problem.
4.
Proof of the existence of the Nash-equilibrium for n = 2 tosses From Theorem 2.2, we can assume that Player I and II are following discrete distributions. Let us assume that Player I is choosing p according to 0 = p 0 ≤ p 1 ≤ p 2 ≤ p 3 = 1, where the probability of choosing p i is m i , for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, with m i = 1. Taking into account the symmetry of the problem, we can also assume that p 2 = 1 − p 1 , m 0 = m 3 , and m 1 = m 2 .
Thus, if Player II knows the outcome is i heads (i ∈ {0, 1, 2}), his guess is a 0 , a 1 or a 2 , respectively. Notice (see (2.2)) that
D(a 0 , a 1 , a 2 ; 1) = 1 − a 2 , and so the expected penalty is
Next, we search for values of p i and m i such that E(a 0 , a 1 , a 2 ; p 1 ) does not depend on a 0 , a 1 , a 2 :
under the condition that the interlacing property
Thus, E(a 0 , a 1 , a 2 ; p 1 ) will be independent of a 0 , a 1 and
Recall also, that m 0 + m 1 = 0.5. Solving these two equations yields
, and (4.4) (4.5) and substituting (4.3) and (4.4) in (4.5), we finally obtain
Therefore, we must maximize E(p 1 ) on [0, 1]. The necessary condition E ′ (p 1 ) = 0, yields p 3 1 − p 2 1 + 3p 1 − 1 = 0. This polynomial equation has a single real root given by (3.1), for which E(p 1 ) = E(0.3611...) ≈ 0.1916. It is not necessary to verify that this value is indeed maximizing E(p 1 ). Instead, we also define a strategy for Player II, and show that we have a Nash-equilibrium (2.5) with these strategies.
First, we claim that for any choice of a 0 , a 1 , a 2 ∈ [0, 1] we have
where µ is given by (3.1)-(3.2). Indeed, we have seen that if
Now we define the strategy of Player II. Recall that (see (2.2))
Let a 0 = E(p 1 ) (see (3.1) and (4.6)), a 1 = 0.5, Figure 2 . Clearly, f (0) = f (1) = a 0 . Direct but cumbersome calculations show that f (p 1 ) = a 0 and f ′ (p 1 ) = 0, and by symmetry f (1 − p 1 [a 0 , a 1 ] and [a 1 , a 2 ] are concave parabolas, it follows that the set of absolute maxima of f , M (f ), may not contain more than 4 points, which are precisely 0,
Therefore, for any µ ∈ Ω we have that
and the Nash-equilibrium (2.5) is established (see also (4.7)).
Uniqueness of the Nash-Equilibrium for n = 2 Tosses
We now focus on the uniqueness of the Nash-equilibrium. Let us briefly review the goals of the two players.
Recall that the strategy of Player II is to minimize the maximum of the penalty function, namely determine optimal outcomes {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 } defining an optimal penalty function f (p) := D(a 0 , a 1 , a 2 ; p) (see (4.8)) such that
That such an f exists follows easily by a compactness argument. The strategy of Player I is to find a probability measure dµ ( Clearly,
which implies, after taking the max over all µ, that F ≤ f ∞ . Section 4 establishes sufficient coditions for equality to hold. The goal here is to show they are also necessary and hence define the Nash-equilibrium uniquely. Suppose that the selection of {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 } and µ is such that F = f ∞ . We start with the following Lemma establishing the relative positions of {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 }.
Lemma 5.1. The optimal outcomes {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 } satisfy 0 < a 0 < 0.2 < 0.4 < a 1 < 0.6 < 0.8 < a 2 < 1.
Proof. In Section 4 we exhibited a choice for {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 } where D(a 0 , a 1 , a 2 ; p) ∞ = 0.1916 · · · < 0.2. Therefore, f ∞ < 0. 
Since the global maximum is attained on [0, a 0 ], and it is not at a 0 , the only possibility of it not being at p = 0 is when a 0 − 2a 1 + a 2 < 0 and the x-coordinate of the parabola's vertex (1/2 + a 0 − a 1 )/(a 0 − 2a 1 + a 2 ) > 0, or 1/2 + a 0 − a 1 < 0. This implies that a 1 − a 0 > 1/2, which, as shown in Lemma 5.1, is impossible if f is the optimal solution of (5.2). Therefore, we derive that 0 ∈ M (f ). In a similar fashion one gets 1 ∈ M (f ).
We are now ready to prove the uniqueness of the Nash-equilibrium. 
with m 0 , m 1 , and p 1 given in Section 4.
Proof. We already know that
for some β i ≥ 0, β 0 + β 1 + β 2 + β 3 = 1, and p ∈ (a 0 , a 1 ), q ∈ (a 1 , a 2 ). Since we are in the case of Nash-equilibrium, the quantity
is a global minimum (w.r.t. {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 } ∈ (0, 1)), which implies that ∂E ∂a i = 0. i = 0, 1, 2.
Therefore, the coefficients in front of a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 vanish for the given choice of p, q, and β i , i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Hence, the optimization problem (5.2) becomes a constrained minimization problem M aximize β 3 − β 1 p + β 2 q + 2β 1 p(1 − p) 2 − 2β 2 q Since 1/[x(1−x)] is a convex function, it is easy to see that if x+y is kept constant, the minimum in (5.6) is attained when x = y, which implies that q = 1 − p (and subsequently β 3 = β 0 and β 2 = β 1 ) is a necessary condition for a Nash-equilibrium selection. Moreover, assuming x = y, we obtain that x minimizes the function
Differentiating, we observe that g ′ (x) = 0 has only one solution in [0, 1] satisfying x 3 = 2(1−x) 2 , which shows (1 − p) 3 = 2p 2 , or p = p 1 , where p 1 is given in (3.1). That β 0 = m 0 and β 1 = m 1 now easily follows.
